Cooperative Dilemmas in Rational Debate
Journal:
arXiv
Published Date:
Apr 8, 2025
Abstract
As an epistemic activity, rational debate and discussion requires
cooperation, yet involves a tension between collective and individual
interests. While all participants benefit from collective outcomes like
reaching consensus on true beliefs, individuals face personal costs when
changing their minds. This creates an incentive for each debater to let others
bear the cognitive burden of exploring alternative perspectives. We present a
model to examine the strategic dynamics between debaters motivated by two
competing goals: discovering truth and minimizing belief revisions. Our model
demonstrates that this tension creates social dilemmas where strategies that
are optimal for individuals systematically undermine the collective pursuit of
truth. Paradoxically, our analysis reveals that increasing debaters' motivation
to seek truth can sometimes produce equilibria with worse outcomes for
collective truth discovery. These findings illuminate why rational debate can
fail to achieve optimal epistemic outcomes, even when participants genuinely
value truth.